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Roberta Dreon* 
Pragmatist Aesthetics, twenty years later. Understanding Interpretation, Interpreting Un-
derstanding 
Pragmatist Aesthetics was published in 1992, by now twenty years ago. Through his 
book Richard Shusterman was able to revitalize a debate in the aesthetic field, which tended 
to stagnate. But its claims, implications and consequences went beyond the narrow limits of 
aesthetics, understood as philosophy of art according to a traditional modern approach. 
His reinterpretation of pragmatist aesthetics, expressly derived from Dewey‘s work, was 
able to show not only that those defining anxieties characterizing the analytical debate were 
not particularly successful, but also that the recent tendency to neglect aesthetic elements in 
favour of a complete translation in semantic terms of art‘s questions was not satisfactory1. 
He recovered the basic pragmatist instance according to which aesthetic arguments, 
philosophical theses and, more generally, any intellectual elaboration must respond more or 
less indirectly to our everyday experiences, must explicitly pose the problem of improving 
our lives, of making them more meaningful and more satisfying for a wider number of peo-
ple. 
In comparison to continental approaches toward aesthetics, Pragmatist Aesthetics 
claimed the urgent need to risk a positive formulation of aesthetics. Those negative instanc-
es, as Adorno‘s ones, were able to resist a mere confirmation of existing institutions. Never-
theless they were characterised by a strong elitism, which tended to support social cleavag-
es and to deny human structural needs of enjoying their own experiences. 
Three basic guidelines therefore emerged from that book. The first one was to question 
the gap between authentic and popular arts, showing that we need no rigid dichotomy, 
which in its turn reveals itself as dogmatic and unfounded. Rather, we should discriminate 
within both artistic ‗family groups‘ those relatives who are betters from the worse ones. 
More precisely, we should differentiate between regressive and fertile interaction modali-
ties with works of art, between useless and enhancing artistic practices. His careful analysis 
of rap music (though probably not of the more recent commercial proposals) showed it can 
be very rich in terms of implications and references, and that it is characterised by an ex-
plicit awareness of its basic transformative and appropriative powers. 
The second project concerned the opportunity to develop those forms of reception of the 
so called Fine Arts, which can be able to reinforce critical attitudes toward ethical and so-
cial conditions of existence – and in this sense Shusterman proposed a detailed analysis of 
Eliot‘s Portrait of a Lady, which insisted on its basic ambiguities. 
Finally, a pragmatist aesthetics should recover the continuity of aesthetic aspects with 
ordinary life and put in question the habitual absence of aesthetic meanings from work, pol-
itics or science. Richard Shusterman insisted particularly on the necessity to restore the cen-
trality of the body: despite its often neglected role in feeling, it is recognized as capable of 
peculiar forms of awareness, deeply relevant in our lives. 
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A current reader is also impressed by a basic pluralistic and anti-foundationalist attitude, 
we still need twenty years later. This kind of approach is proved in some pages problema-
tizing the late romantic myth of artistic creation, and interpreting in a rather anti-dogmatic 
way the relations between common energies and ordinary materials, on the one hand, and 
individual instances, on the other one. This sincere non foundationalist attitude emerges al-
so in the chapter devoted to interpretation, where Shusterman propose to think in circular 
terms the relations between more habitual and widely unreflective modes of understanding 
and more explicit and voluntary acts of interpretation, of critical stance – that is by denying 
the pervasiveness of interpretation when it is understood as the product of voluntary and 
primarily verbal acts. 
It is this latter specific subject I propose to consider here, in order to confront its results 
with the recent philosophical debate. This is a topic that does not seem central among Rich-
ard Shusterman‘s latest interests. I suspect that he considers it as a rearguard matter and 
there are no doubt he prefers to explore without a safety net the new territories of a somaes-
thetics under construction. However I think it is still necessary to discuss these concepts 
that perhaps deserve a more explicit ontological stance, as I shall argue later, with respect to 
a certain return to realism in philosophy.  
Besides it could also contribute to a more pluralistic view of the relations between lin-
guistic and bodily aspects of our world experience, after the various turns that have played 
the leading role in the philosophical scene one after the other. 
1. Describing and interpreting 
In his book two central chapters, ―Pragmatism and Interpretation‖ and especially ―Be-
neath Interpretation‖ – which do not appear in the Italian translation of Pragmatist Aesthet-
ics – Shusterman advances the need to avoid monolithic solutions and to draw fine and 
elastic distinctions when speaking of interpretation. In general it emerges the thesis that 
supporting a strong form of contextualism about meanings, together with a resolutely anti-
foundationalist and anti-representational approach in the epistemological field, does not 
imply falling into the simplistic formula according to which ―there are no facts, only inter-
pretations‖, that is to a radical constructivistic reading of Nietzsche‘s expression, whose on-
tological consequences would be the lost of the ‗outside‘ world in favour of a certain range 
of subjective productions of our reality. 
Richard Shusterman‘s greatest merit in this respect, as I mentioned before, is to dissolve 
the universal claims of interpretation in the interplay between forms of understanding and 
interpretive activities. Therefore I will consider here some significant steps of his reflex-
ions. The chapter titled ―Pragmatism and Interpretation‖ is dedicated to the issue of inter-
pretation in literature, but it is quite clear that a certain conception of interpretation in this 
area is not considered as an independent one, on the contrary having broader implications - 
and we can remember that the continuity of eminently artistic practices with our daily inter-
actions with our environment is one of the thesis opening Dewey‘s Art as Experience. 
Is it possible to distinguish between description and interpretation when having to cope 
with a novel or a poem? Shusterman‘s answer is at first open, pragmatically possibilist: it 
depends on how we understand description. There are no difficulties if we do not think of it 
as a kind of picture just recording existing data, but as a particular collection of ‗facts‘ on 
which a certain readers community agree in fairly stable circumstances, that is as selection 
of the most relevant aspects for interpretation. Moreover, such a distinction can be sus-
tained if we do not mean the relationship between this kind of description and interpretation 
ROBERTA DREON                                                                        PRAGMATIST  AESTHETICS TWENTY YEARS LATER 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
ISSN: 2036-4091 2012, IV, 1 
 262 
 
in foundational terms, because a new interpretation can react on the alleged initial data and 
revise them, correct them and eventually select other ones. 
But Shusterman affirms that from a certain point of view just the removal of each de-
scriptive layer in favour of a total interpreting, sustained by more radical deconstructionists, 
is connected to a reifying conception of meaning: if one assumes that there is something 
like an overt or a hidden meaning of the text, regardless of the readings that we can make of 
it, as Wolfgang Iser could say, interpretation becomes the only play in town, because in the 
absence of an already given meaning, we can attribute arbitrary meanings to the text
2
. What 
you need doing is rather to stop thinking about meaning as a particular thing to decipher – 
the author‘s intention, the spirit of the time, an ideological message, a removed truth – and 
to understand interpretation differently. Interpreting a text is a kind of practice, is making 
something, giving it a meaningful answer in the sense that under certain conditions of expe-
rience – my reading, ours or that of someone other – it makes sense, it produces a certain 
experience of the world. 
Clearly this is a ―general hermeneutics direction‖, but it is not pervasive, because from 
the beginnings it is specified by two sets of considerations. 
The first one concerns the fact that not all our answers to a text are guided by cognitive 
intents. For instance, we read for the pleasure we derive from a certain story, or because it 
is fertile for new imaginative possibilities. In other terms, the cognitive approach is not al-
ways the dominant one in reading: I do not read train timetables in order to know them, but 
to choose a train that takes me to my appointment at the appointed time. Furthermore, the 
response capable of making some literary work understandable is not necessarily a verbal 
one, but can be more direct and immediate. If the reading of the academic critic fits the idea 
of interpretation, our ordinarily reading can be adapted to the formula of ―simply reading‖ 
or of understanding, while the idea that we are interpreting the text seems forced to us.  
But while considering those aspects, Shusterman sketches a contextualist and anti-
dogmatic background, where every single word has its own weight. 
It is clear that the critique of description conceived as a mirror of real data, together 
with the refusal of a reifying conception of meaning, are related to the rejection of a corre-
spondentist version of truth. However the correspondence of our statements or our thoughts 
with independent objects ‗in itself‘ or with alleged facts is unacceptable to the American 
pragmatist, not because the ones and the others are linguistically constructed, but because 
―independent objects … like facts, can not be isolated from our discoursive practices‖. The 
linguistic mediation is inevitable and makes unfeasible a world description from God‘s 
transcendental point of view, but that does not mean that it idealistically produces the 
world. In stark contrast with Rorty‘s familiar thesis according to which the liberating out-
come of the linguistic turn would be the loss of the world, Shusterman noted in a footnote 
that this does not imply to reduce the world and its experience to language and a few pages 
later argues that to welcome the linguistic turn does not involve a similar reduction of the 
world and its experience to language
3
. By making explicit an assumption not stated by the 
philosopher himself, I would simply say that in our experience we meet just the world and 
not our subjective projections, it is with our world that we are busy, not only thanks to a 
tangle of words, but also of habits, gestures, postures, feelings, practices, actions. It is this 
last point - that of non-interpretive and non-linguistic aspects of our experience – that takes 
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Shusterman‘s attention. I understand his being ontological cautious in the name of a healthy 
pragmatic pluralism, but sometimes we need to make our ontological assumptions explicit. 
If we can maintain the hermeneutical, understanding and interpretative character of our 
experiences, as I will explain later, it is because we think we are talking about it from the 
inside, and most of all to practice it from the inside. Therefore our postures, our gestures 
and our movements – from concrete to abstract and virtual ones – allow us to access our 
environment selectively and always in pre-oriented ways, but in fact it deals with an access 
to our shared world and not to our subjective constructions. In other words, it is our inher-
ence to the world from its inside that produces the prospective character of our experience 
of things and ensures in the same time that it is our experience of things and not of mere 
mental projections. 
2. Preserving immediate understanding 
The heart of the matter for the American philosopher is to distinguish between under-
standing and interpretation in order to preserve the forms of immediate understanding. It 
seems to me that this is the underlying reason bringing him to criticize a pervasive notion of 
interpretation, while sharing an anti-foundationalist conception of human relationships with 
things – according to which our knowledge of what they are in themselves would ultimately 
be anchored in a perception of neutral data, that is of non-interpreted data, which would be 
given before additional meanings we could eventually attribute to them. 
Shusterman begins his argument by claiming he shares the anti-foundationalist position 
supported by hermeneutic universalism, namely the rejection of the idea of a reality in it-
self, independently determined from the experience we have of it. Furthermore he explicitly 
recognizes that interpretation plays an important role in our experience of the world – in-
deed a irreplaceable one. However he says that ―our intelligent and meaningful intercourse 
with the world includes non-interpretational experience, activity and understanding, so that 
we should not think that interpretation is the only game in town‖4. Therefore it appears to 
be more fertile to draw a functional distinction between interpretation and understanding, 
rather then a strictly ontological one, that is between interpreting and equally selective 
forms of experience, which are context specific and perspective, but not explicit, thoughtful 
or deliberate. 
If it is wrong to believe that interpreting consists in discovering hidden layers of mean-
ing, recognizing the structural perspective, partial, pre-oriented character of our experiences 
in the world does not imply that any form of understanding is interpretative. In everyday 
situations, but when we read a novel too, we implicitly orient ourselves according to our 
interests, prejudices, impulses, needs and habits, which, far from hindering our encounter 
with the world, allow us to understand it, as acknowledged by both supporters of hermeneu-
tics and pragmatists. But it should be noted, against the alleged pervasiveness of interpreta-
tion, that very often our focus is implicit, unreflective, immediate. At least it functions this 
way all the times things work for themselves, when there is no problem, when, in Dewey‘s 
words, we are not faced with an indeterminate situation, where we do not know what to do, 
and we need to return analytically on various critical aspects to find a way-out, a solution. 
The role of interpretation is of this type. Clearly this is an absolutely central role in any crit-
ical situation, but not everywhere. Otherwise we would fall into the fallacy that all our in-
tellectual selective behaviour should be guided by a clear thought and deliberate decisions. 
Instead, very often our behaviours are driven by habits, which are more or less intelligent 
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but not conscious, so we know immediately what to do, how we have to relate to that indi-
vidual in that situation, or to that text. 
Shusterman‘s idea is therefore that interpretation is a behaviour, a type of reflective 
practice, knowingly and intentionally structured – a form of inquiry, to use Dewey‘s term. 
On the contrary understanding concerns the soil of our immediate experience, which are 
nevertheless mediated by words, habits, feelings, or more. But they are immediate in the 
sense that they pose no difficulties: individual and social habits, motor and conceptual pat-
terns, intellectual and emotional biases work and we need not to put them in question. The 
point is not to assimilate all forms of active and selective intelligence to intellectual reflec-
tions, to differentiating and interpreting analysis, in order to preserve immediately signifi-
cant environmental experiences. 
The hermeneutical circle should be understood as a hermeneutic circularity of under-
standing and interpretation, characterized by complex stratification and mutual relations. 
The distinction between understanding and interpretation proposed by Shusterman is not 
strictly ontological, but based on their function, which in turn is not definitive, but open 
and, in certain situations, interchangeable. Generally, understanding works in the back-
ground, as basis and guide of interpretation, which, in its turn, explores, modifies, articu-
lates its meaning. While understanding is unconscious, silent, because, proceeding from it-
self, it does not need to be said, to be noticed, interpretation requires an explicit stance, a 
conscious reflection aimed at resolving a crisis. Moreover, while when I am interpreting, I 
am usually aware of a plurality of possible alternatives, when I simply understand some-
thing without posing problems to myself, while being prospectively oriented, I am often 
blind to other alternatives. Finally, while interpretation is above all linguistically drawn, 
understanding is often not verbal but rather gestural, affective, habitual. It is not certain in-
effable in the alleged mystical sense of the term: quite simply it often does not need to be 
said, does not require a speech because it simply works, and indeed there is no need to talk 
about it. But here it is, according to Shusterman‘s opinion, the critical point of hermeneutic 
universalism. It requires not only the thesis that all understanding is a form of interpretation 
but also the further one according to which every kind of understanding would be linguistic, 
since interpretation is eminently linguistic. If Gadamer argues that being that can be under-
stood is language and, on the other side, Rorty and Derrida deny the existence of any ―hors-
texte‖, Shusterman warns us that the need for linguistic mediation does not exclude experi-
ences that are meaningful without being linguistic, because they concern ―those unmanage-
ably illiterate and darkly somatic neighborhoods of town that we philosophers and literary 
theorists are occupationally accostomed to avoid and ignore, but on which we rely for our 
non-professional sustenance and satisfactions‖5.  
3. Something about language 
It is a merit we can undoubtedly attribute to the American philosopher having recovered 
from pragmatist pluralism the need to recognize the richness of our experiences of the 
world, which are significant not only because of the language we speak, but also because of 
the way in which we move in it, of the orientation we assume, of the feelings we experi-
ence, of postural and behavioural habits we acquire, thoughts we largely implicitly adopt, 
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bodily techniques and, I would add, extracorporeal technologies we commonly use
6
. We do 
not always need say things, and nonetheless they are already significant for us. 
The hermeneutical strategy of expanding the meaning of language, since to include non-
verbal forms of experience, communication or signification, has been much discussed and it 
remains indeed questionable. If it can bring out the already significant and almost interlocu-
tory structure of perception, of bodily movements, and of the various human practices, from 
an other point of view it risks to transform verbal language in a sort of transcendental con-
dition of all forms of experience. But let me propose two sets of considerations in the spirit 
that characterizes Shusterman‘s frankly anti-dogmatic work. 
The first one, whose the American philosopher is well conscious, but prefers leaving at 
the edge of his text, concerns the placement of language in the strict sense of the term with 
respect to the play between understanding and interpretation. It is clear that words consti-
tute an outstanding way of analysis and reworking of the different elements of our experi-
ence and certainly more explicitly critical phases of our interactions with the world favour 
verbal language powerful determination and classificatory capacities. Therefore there is no 
doubt that interpretive practices do not require it as a tool simply intended as carrying out 
something already established by itself – of mental images or of state of things ‗out there‘. 
It is rather a powerful mean to actively intervene in the new elaboration of existential mate-
rials. 
Shusterman rightly criticizes Davidson‘s thesis that all understanding of the interlocu-
tor‘s speech would require a radical interpretation, because when we are moving ourselves 
in our mother tongue, and especially when words work and do not pose difficulties, under-
standing is largely habitual, implicit, immediate. 
However, in these chapters the qualitative and almost bodily dimension of language re-
mains largely neglected. I refer to those aspects of language such as, while we are reading a 
verse or a novel page, meaning is not only or not eminently given in referential forms, but it 
is based also on the sensual and affective texture of words, producing not primarily intellec-
tual responses in the reader: pleasure, enjoyment, repulsion, attraction or an ambiguous 
mixture of both in front of obscenity or violence, for example. But this aesthetic dimension 
of language also affects our daily conversations, the components of timbre, melodic inter-
jections, exclamations, pauses, or all those aspects that contribute to structure our relation-
ships with others. 
A second set of considerations concerns a certain primacy that seems to be attributed to 
an already fully significant but not linguistic bodily dimension
7
. Of course when I feel pain 
– because of a wound or of a death - that is not a primarily linguistic experience, although it 
can be said in words, it may need it or not. However I am not entirely convinced we would 
feel pain - not physical and psychological, but somatic pain, in the anti-dualistic sense 
Shusterman rightly promoted – just as we human feel it, if we were not already immersed in 
a language before actually becoming able to speak and even before acquiring referentially 
oriented passive language skills. 
This is not to support a new primacy of language, but to sustain – perhaps trivially – 
that interrelationships between linguistic and bodily aspects of our experience are always 
already behind us. We could talk about a form of mutual conditioning or of circularity be-
tween mostly bodily aspects and eminently linguistic ones, by which in the same time we 
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feel and mean the world. Relations with it are played from the inside: they are therefore se-
lective, prospective, already pre-oriented from our specific anchorage in it, but they are just 
about the world we belong to. They are not relations between a supposed inert subject and 
his private or shared hallucinations. On the other hand, if we want to talk about circularity, 
this is not analogous to the circle between understanding and interpretation, because there 
are no specific places or fixed means for the implicit, on the one hand, and for reflection, on 
the other. 
As Shusterman taught us, there are forms of bodily awareness which are very attentive, 
and on the other side words may also have an immediate very strong emotional impact on 
us. To learn how to swim I have to be able to coordinate inhalation with the exit of my head 
from water and exhaling through the next dive, I have to pay attention to a breathing physi-
ological habit as old as me, in order to change it in special circumstances. But the cry of a 
child who has finally learned to stay afloat, not to swallow water and then he does not even 
know how he moves his arms, unless you ask him, is completely natural and spontaneous, 
not mediated by reflection. On the other hand, to focus attention on the peculiar movement 
of the arm in freestyle, rather than in the frog, I learn to isolate on a both motor and linguis-
tic level a certain analytic portion of an unitary practice. Then, when I learned well, I just 
enjoy the energetic pleasure of swimming - and calling it ‗energetic‘ in retrospect I under-
stand more clearly what I felt. 
 
